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Saba Mahmood, Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2011), ISBN: 978-0-691-14980-6 
 
The recent ethnographic account by Saba Mahmood, devoted to the feminine pietistic move-
ments in Egypt,1 offers crucial theoretical insights for foucauldian deconstruction of both sub-
jects and sovereignty. 
The analysis of a movement, which could be easily inscribed into what is now called 
the “Islamic revival,” and which is too often dismissed through the incredibly vague label of 
“Islamic fundamentalism,” reveals itself as the actual possibility to organize one of the most 
sophisticated theoretical contestation of that liberal framework through which—almost always 
—we look at ethics and politics.  Mahmood recalls all the theoretical attempts at subverting 
this framework.  Cases such as those of the Subaltern Studies collective or the historiograph-
ical school inspired by the British New Left could easily be considered paradigmatic in this 
effort, which seeks to “give voice” to subjects excluded from the trajectory of liberal modernity 
and from its forms of categorization.  This amounts to exclusion from what counts as “poli-
tics” and from whom who deserves the title of “political subjects.”  However, according to 
Mahmood, even such a theoretical exercise seems somehow dependent on an idea of agency 
centered on autonomy. 
This is the very same problem encountered many years before by Lila Abu-Lughod in 
her study of Bedouin women.2  Returning to the issue years later, Abu-Lughod critically called 
into question the very theoretical impulse that forced her to look for gestures, attitudes, and 
actions that should have exhibited possible traits of “resistance.”  Those traits were at the same 
time what prevented her from analyzing the operations of power contributing to fabric the 
very same scene on which resistance acquired an intrinsically positive moral salience.3   Such 
                                                 
1 The first edition was published by the same publisher in 2005. 
2 L. Abu-Lughod, “The Romance of Resistance: Tracing Transformations of Power through Bedouin Wom-
en,” American Ethnologist 17, 1, (1990), 41-55. 
3 L. Abu-Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2000): “First, how might we develop theories that give these women credit for resisting in a variety of 
creative ways the power of those who control so much of their lives, without either misattributing to them 
forms of consciousness or politics that are not part of their experience—something like a feminist conscious-
ness or feminist politics—or devaluing their practices as prepolitical, primitive, or even misguided? Second, 
how might we account for the fact that Bedouin women both resist and support the existing system of power 
(they support it through practices like veiling, for example), without resorting to analytical concepts like 
false consciousness, which dismisses their own understanding of their situation, or impression management, 
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as an impulse to romanticize resistance made many other gestures, actions, and experiences 
opaque, because they were not immediately recognizable as acts of resistance.  They thus re-
main mute to the observer, even if they produced relevant transformations in the actual expe-
rience of social actors. 
Abu-Lughod therefore proposed to interpret resistance itself as a diagnosis of power, 
so as to attain the double objective of distinguishing more accurately different modes of re-
sistance and describing more precisely those operations of power with which subjects were 
confronted and through which they were produced: “We should learn to read in various local 
and everyday resistances the existence of a range of specific strategies and structures of power.  
Attention to the forms of resistance in particular societies can help us become critical of partial 
or reductionist theories of power.  The problem has been that those of us who have sensed that 
there is something admirable about resistance have tended to look to it for hopeful confirma-
tion of the failure-or partial failure-of systems of oppression.  Yet it seems to me that we re-
spect everyday resistance not just by arguing for the dignity or heroism of the resistors but by 
letting their practices teaches us about the complex interworkings of historically changing 
structures of power.”4 
The novelty introduced by Mahmood into this theoretical démarche is precisely the ca-
pricious scrutiny to which she submits the very concept of resistance.  What she is propound-
ing is in fact an attempt to elude the teleological trap that does not allow new forms of life and 
action, which are not already encapsulated into a narrative of subversion and inscription of 
the norms to appear.  This is, as one can see, an extreme critique.  The paradigm of negotia-
tion, to which the foucauldian idea of governmentality relates, depends precisely on this dia-
lectic between subversion of norms and extension of their field of signification through crea-
tive appropriations, deliberate abuses, and conscious distortions.  Mahmood’s project has a 
clear resonance with this project of demoralizing theory, while reinforcing and complicating it.   
What she is contesting is in fact the presumption and the presupposition concerning 
the universality of the liberal desire of being free from subordination.  The intrinsic normativi-
ty of the concept of freedom leads to a neutralization of those liberal presumptions presiding 
to the unfolding of whatever theory.  Mahmood’s theoretical gesture indexes the possible sep-
aration of both auto-realization from the autonomous will and of agency from the discursive 
infrastructures of progressive politics.  This attempt holds the very lesson of Mahmood’s eth-
nography: even the most aggressive and, let’s say, demoralized post-structural theory always 
ends up thinking of agency as entrapped by the opposite poles of subordination and subver-
sion.  Certainly, negotiation itself renders this framework much more porous, showing the 
transitivity and the radical contingency between these two poles and all the subjective posi-
tionings that can be found along the infinite range of concrete situations historically and local-
ly occurring between them. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
which makes of them cynical manipulators? Third, how might we acknowledge that their forms of re-
sistance, such as folktales and poetry, may be culturally provided without immediately assuming that even 
though we cannot therefore call them cathartic personal expressions, they must somehow be safety valves?” 
(47) 
4 Ibid., 53. 
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While insisting on the absolute contingency and historicity of agency, and instead of 
confining it to the pattern of resistance to norms, Mahmood expands it according to the idea 
that norms can also be “inhabited.”  All in all, the auto-comprehension of social actors be-
comes crucial, although it is coupled with the foucauldian paradox of subjectivation.  This line 
of reflection comes to Mahmood via Judith Butler who considers subjection the possibility of 
agency itself.  But if Butler insists on the radical transitivity between the doing and undoing of 
social norms, due to the performative iterability, which institutes them, according to 
Mahmood she would be still prisoner of an agonistic model of norms, which can be only con-
firmed or subverted.  On the contrary, according to Mahmood, norms can also always be per-
formed and inhabited.  In this way she is trying to elude the traps of an antagonistic or dualis-
tic framework so as to consider the possibility that norms actually structure even the interiori-
ty of the subject. 
It seems that Mahmood’s project could go hand in hand with the paradigm of negotia-
tion, which is by no means confined to the brute alternative between confirmation or subver-
sion of norms, but which rather permits a reading of the myriads of intermediate spaces host-
ed between these two poles, and, in so doing, it offers a virtual catalogue of all possible con-
tacts between subjects and norms.  According to the catalogue offered by Mahmood herself, 
norms can actually—besides being confirmed or subverted—also be inhabited, aspired, 
searched, and consumed. 
The paradigm introduced by Mahmood also subverts the framework of a theory of 
power as negotiation, multiplying the foundations of a demoralized reading of subjectivation 
processes hosted by neoliberal governmentality.  The suggestion to look at agency in a non-
liberal framework offers the opportunity of gaining an analysis of those complex relationships 
between the immanent form of a normative act, the model of subject it presupposes, and the 
types of authority on which is based.  In order to produce such as an analytic palimpsest, 
Mahmood explicitly recalls Foucault, introducing his late reflection on ethics and trying to 
give to it a resolute and affirmative reading, giving the right place to corporeal practices and 
their effects on the self and conduct. 
What is at stake here is the clear articulation of the relationship between practices and 
way of life, or, in a foucauldian vocabulary, the relationship between ethics and moral, so to 
trace the relationship between moral code and ethical conduct, which may crystallize in a par-
ticular form of life.  This relationship is not metaphorically embodied in those practices 
through which moral norms, which are historically produced, are lived and interpreted.  
Though, Mahmood’s question to those women who engage themselves in pietistic Islamic 
movements sounds like that: what is left of freedom in a framework where submission to au-
thority and the deployment of subjective potentialities are indiscernible?  Consequently, the 
theoretical question will be: how can we think of agency beyond freedom? 
Similar moral difficulties could be experienced in even less exotic settings.  A concep-
tion of agency based on the dramatic idea of decision and representing the genetic patrimony 
of the paradigm of sovereignty is now passively contested also in affluent countries.  In that 
context of ordinary difficulty to conduct oneself through the landscape of advanced capitalist 
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economies, which Lauren Berlant calls “slow death,”5 even obesity can reveal itself as a special 
form of counter-conduct.  In fact, Berlant studies a social scene where the concept of sover-
eignty seems to be exhausted and presses us to rethink some forms of reproduction of social 
life beyond the liberal framework of autonomy.6  That of Berlant is a hypothesis on agency, 
which is equal and opposite to that propounded by Mahmood.  Both contest the normative 
value of will; but if the case of women engaged in Egyptian pietistic movements reflects an 
idea of sensibility to the authoritative character of norms, that of the obese people refers rather 
to forms of detachment and passive auto-suspension from hegemonic social signifiers. 
In this case one deals with a special form of “lateral agency,” which constitutes a way 
in which to inhabit non-sovereignly the epoch of “slow death”: an auto-interruption—or an 
interruption of the autos—and a suspension of will: “In the scene of slow death, a condition of 
being worn out by the activity of reproducing life, agency can be an activity of maintenance, 
not making; fantasy, without grandiosity; sentience, without full intentionality; inconsistency, 
without shattering; embodying, alongside embodiment.”7   
This could be seen as a twofold exercise: one the one hand, it implies a suspension of an 
already capitalistically and productively oriented will and, on the other hand, it suggests a 
possible accommodation in the same horizon of “slow death” in order to render it more hospi-
table: “These pleasures can be seen as interrupting the liberal and capitalist subject called to 
consciousness, intentionality, and effective will.”8   
Of course, Mahmood’s operation, as that of Berlant, is not free of risks and she is fully 
aware of that.  Mahmood replies the accusations of subjectivism and of eluding the political 
dimension or its implicit absorption into the moral or the ethical, through a resolute historici-
zation of the concept of agency.  This one should be explored, she argues, within the concep-
tual grammar where it resides.  Furthermore, Mahmood argues about the importance of man-
aging the nexus between politics and ethics to the point where, in certain contexts, one could 
consider the latter as an historical instance of the former.  This is a fundamental piece of the 
argument, according to which it seems necessary to enlarge the boundaries of experiences and 
subjects, which could be annexed to the threshold of politics.  This exercise implies the capaci-
ty to grasp what, even though not discursively reducible to politics, produces it otherwise.  
Dismissing this fragile, though crucial, metamorphosis one runs the risk of losing not only 
                                                 
5 L. Berlant, “Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency),” Critical Inquiry, 33 (2007), 754-780.  Now 
also in Ead, Cruel Optimism (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 95-120. 
6 Ibid., 756: “Because of these convolutions and variations sovereignty is an inadequate concept for talking 
about human agency outside of the power of the king’s decree or other boundary acts in proximity to certain 
performances of law, like executions and pardons.  For so many reasons the ordinary subjects of democrat-
ic/capitalist power might best be redefined as only partially (that is to say phantasmatically or not) sovereign. 
But some may want to continue using the concept because of the history of investment in it as a marker for 
the liberal sense of personal autonomy and freedom or because of the association of democracy with the 
legal protection of the body politic and subgroups within it.” 
7 Ibid., 759. 
8 Ibid., 779. 
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“politics,” but more trivially and more culpably, all that eludes the political radar of the re-
searcher.9 
It is the very idea of critique and theory that is profoundly transformed; far from being 
a disruptive exercise it transforms itself into a transformative exercise.  A transformation that 
touches the subject engaged in the research.  According to the foucauldian idea of «modifica-
tions», the knowing subject should work on the effects produced by the object of the research 
on herself and therefore construct new conceptual tools each time, enhancing the ancient ones, 
and organizing the very field of visibility according to new measures and scales. 
The extreme case of Mahmood’s Islam is the hic Rodhus hic salta of a demoralized theory 
seeking to question its own sense of inadequacy and uneasiness, elaborating strategies to ex-
pand its own conceptual horizon, so as to make it more hospitable and less auto-referential.  
The extension of the field of politics and of its subjects seems to be one of the more urgent 
tasks solicited by neoliberal processes of subjectivation.  To decide moralistically not to play 
the game, deciding that a certain kind of experience does not deserve the attribute of “politics” 
—and maybe confining it to the larval dominion of the pre- or the post-political—, is the best 
way to make oneself blind to political experimentations speaking of new ways of being sub-
jects in the present, of surviving, living, inhabiting, interpreting, and fighting neoliberal gov-
ernmentality.   
The core of Mahmood’s challenge is her attempt, operated through the ethnographic 
supplement, to contest the anthropology of liberalism and, above all, its intrinsic normative 
value.  One should undo the knot which unifies property, will, and freedom, and links this 
conceptual constellation to interests and desires.  (Late) liberalism has become a form of life 
that decides the very way in which we imagine humanity.  Of course it is, and it continues to 
be, a crucial discursive resource even to think of resistance and, according to the spivakian 
logic of the “enabling violation,” a number of pieces of its trans-local discourse are by now a 
patrimony shared also by those who contest or simply are subjected to it.  Nonetheless, liberal-
ism remains absolutely blind to the possibility of other experiences; to the fact, in other words, 
that could exist other conceptions of the self-irreducible to the—cohercitive—discourse of lib-
eral freedom.   
The theoretical effort that neoliberal processes of subjectivation are claiming, is the ca-
pability to recognize other political imaginaries, peopled by another quality of subjects who 
hold desires that do not coincide all and only with that of liberal freedom.  These are different 
ways to imagine and to live difference.  Obviously, in this theoretical framework, genealogy is 
a fundamental tool to show the contingency of the present through the disclosure of neglected 
conceptual fields or the recovery of salient historical sequences.  And, by the way, the anthro-
pological narrative, referring to contemporaneity, has the very same function: to show the con-
tingency of our present being-so-and-so, eluding the forclusion of possible futures and the 
occlusion of the possibility to imagine ourselves differently. 
In order to accomplish this ambitious theoretical program one should question all lib-
eral normative assumptions about human nature, calling into question that naturalization of 
the desire for freedom that Mahmood has singled out as the crucial tool through which liberal-
                                                 
9 Cfr. S. Mahmood, 35. 
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ism institutes itself as the normative model of politics, displacing it at the core of the Maniche-
an dialectic between freedom and coercion.  One should even run the risk of loosing the “ref-
erence model” in order to both accept the plurality, contingency, and diversity of different 
models, and to reconstruct new models at the height of those forms of life that materially em-
body and contest them. 
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